the assignment of redoing that.”. At 10:30 the following morning, Powell addressed the international body. Powell advocated the approach championed by Blair and Straw: have Bush go to the U.N. and press for a resolution condemning Hussein. “It was the kind of specificity we needed to show. In a pre-recorded speech, Powell … Colin Powell was secretary of state under President George W. Bush when America invaded Iraq. Such a coalition, achieved through the passage of a United Nations resolution, might persuade Saddam Hussein to comply with weapons inspectors and avoid military confrontation. With the benefit of 15 years of hindsight, it’s possible to see Powell’s U.N. speech as a signal event in the broader story of American governance. Rumsfeld was adamant that the United States should not be slowed down by coalition-building. But in 1996, Kamel returned to Iraq, where he was killed by Saddam’s regime. analysts and an Australian intelligence officer eventually brought the Iraqi procurement agent in for questioning and confronted him about the American maps. second bullet. Four tons. Rove found much to admire about it as well. The EPA’s Office of Inspector General issued a plan for cutting exposure to ethylene oxide and chloroprene. As far as this went, this was accurate. Powell would almost certainly have been obligated to resign, and many if not all of his top staff members involved in the Iraq issue would also have quit; several had already considered doing so the previous summer. director said that he did. On that February 5 in front of the U.N. Security Council, was Colin Powell certain what he was saying was accurate? The New York Times Magazine on Friday posted “Colin Powell Still Wants Answers,” a long article by Robert Draper to appear in Sunday’s edition. Which ironically made it that much more difficult to change the analytic line that we’d stuck with for 10 years. During his presentation he stated that he believed "without a doubt Sadd… Powell was tasked with presenting the case for invading Iraqto the UN General Assembly, and he dutifully went ahead. Alarmed, the distributor contacted the authorities. But Curveball’s claims to have been part of a mobile biological-weapons program had also polarized the agency. But this revelation, like others tempering the most dire view of Iraq’s capabilities, was swept aside by the self-compounding momentum toward war. He mournfully predicted to others that his obituary’s first paragraph would include his authorship of the U.N. speech. “I told him, ‘Removing Saddam is the easy part,’” he said. “What choice did I have? The burden would then be on the C.I.A. Did you know he said there were no WMDs? He was on hand for the opening of Bush’s presidential library in 2013. Colin Powell Still Wants Answers In 2003, he made the case for invading Iraq to halt its weapons programs. You write to prove a thesis, rather than evaluating the information. Powell’s own intelligence staff, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, prepared two memos commenting on drafts of the presentation. The German intelligence agency handling Curveball “has not been able to verify his reporting,” Wippl warned. Tenet was there, along with McLaughlin and the aluminum tube he had taken to carrying as a prop, which at one point he rolled across the conference-room table. Kurdish? “The really strong stuff was Curveball,” remembered Bill McLaughlin, a C.I.A. “Iraq,” he told Congress, “continues to flaunt its hostility towards America and to support terror.”, Throughout early 2002, the Iraq debate played out largely in the National Security Council cabinet-level meetings known as the Principals Committee. He instructed Wilkerson to start from scratch. Partager. It was not the turf that anyone, least of all Powell himself, would have imagined for him in 2001. However, when he translated what they were saying, he knowingly embellished it, turning it from evidence Iraq was complying with U.N. resolutions to evidence Iraq was violating them. What’s the source on this? He did not appear to mean it sarcastically. Straw was plainly frustrated with Blair, who he feared was becoming Bush’s enabler. Husam Amin told them that the government would hold them responsible if UNMOVIC found any WMD in their units or areas, or if there was anything that cast doubt on Iraq’s cooperation with UNMOVIC. “George was on the team, and that itself is an issue,” Wippl would later reflect. THIELMANN: I can only assume that he was doing it to loyally support the president of the United States and build the strongest possible case for arguing that there was no alternative to the use of military force. While the corporate media has never taken a close look at this record, we can go through Powell’s presentation line by line to demonstrate the chasm between what he knew and what he told the world. POWELL: [K]ey files from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to avoid detection. “This will become your first term.”. Powell pressed him to keep trying. For two hours, Rice said little while Powell proceeded to do what no one else in the Bush administration had done or would do: tell the president to his face that things in Iraq could go horribly wrong. “Well, no. The fact that such a presentation was being ordered up was tantamount to a White House vote of no confidence in Blix. POWELL: These are facts, corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of the intelligence services of other countries. “What’s ‘high confidence’?” she asked. In the spring of 2002, the agent had given an Australian equipment distributor his shopping list. On Dec. 28, Walpole and McLaughlin went to the White House to discuss the Case with Rice. This P.D.B. J'envoie. McLaughlin met with the agency’s analytical team headed by Bob Walpole, the national intelligence officer for strategic programs. Powell’s presentation left out extremely important information, as here: POWELL: Iraq’s record on chemical weapons is replete with lies. They were later quietly released as appendices to the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on WMD intelligence. This domino effect required a first move by Bush’s secretary of state. He was, as a top National Security Council staff member who respected Powell would recall, “more of a dissident, who,” as the administration drifted steadily toward confrontation with Hussein, “would say, ‘I’m fighting a rear-guard action against these [expletive] crazies.’”. But he has not attended the administration’s annual alumni gatherings, and since leaving office he has refused to defend Bush’s legacy-defining decision to invade Iraq. McLaughlin reviewed them with astonishment. Because of its long shadow, the U.N. speech invites one of the Bush presidency’s most poignant what-ifs. The general had directed the procurement agent to buy equipment for Iraq’s unmanned aerial vehicles program. But by the summer of 2002, this argument was clearly losing ground. At one point during our first conversation in 2018, he paraphrased a line about Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction from the intelligence assessment that had informed his U.N. speech, which intelligence officials had assured him was rock solid: “ ‘We judge that they have 100 to 500 metric tons of chemical weapons, all produced within the last year.’ How could they have known that?” he said with caustic disbelief. “Eric,” Edelman recalled him asking, “has the president already decided to go to war, and we’re just in this interagency circle jerk?”, “I don’t think the president has decided to go to war,” Edelman replied. That Tenet did not resist the request suggested that the agency had crossed a red line. last bullet. Powell, who was secretary of state under President George W. Bush, was much more than just horribly mistaken: He fabricated “evidence” and ignored repeated warnings that what he was saying was false. Colin Powell, Irak. analysts knew only that he once had such a stockpile, before the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and that it was thought to be as much as 500 metric tons before the weapons were destroyed. at the time. I am being completely honest about this. At the beginning of one meeting, Richard Armitage, Powell’s deputy secretary, genially offered the vice president some coffee. Let them hang themselves. Bush would have to accept a changed regime as a substitute for regime change. This was particularly evident on the subject of Hussein’s biological-weapons capabilities. He spoke of decontamination trucks at chemical-weapons factories, to the consternation of the chemical-weapons analyst Larry Fox, who had repeatedly warned that the speech was making too much out of what might well be innocuous vehicles but had been repeatedly overruled by his superiors. “I went into that bunker that those trucks pulled up to. “Bob?” she said with evident concern. Powell viewed the document suspiciously. That’s all it takes to support the journalism you rely on. was putting its seal of approval on administration policy — but he was way past the point of protesting. The American intelligence community still did not have access to the source himself. “We don’t have a case officer in touch with this guy,” Tenet had once muttered to his staff. Libby had instructed his Middle East specialist to put every damning bit of raw intelligence he could find into his brief. “The president doesn’t think it’s nearly persuasive enough,” Cheney’s chief of staff said. When another C.I.A. Colin Powell in Virginia this month. “Here we had this precious access,” recalled one of Tenet’s senior analysts, “and he didn’t want to blow it.”. Rumsfeld was not Powell’s only rival in the room. The speech set out to detail Iraq’s … HUSSEINI: You didn’t know that, even though it was reported? The first INR memo, from January 29, 2003, flagged this claim as “WEAK”: second bullet. Cheney smiled. Just hours before Powell joined Bush for dinner on Aug. 5, General Franks briefed Bush on what would become the final war plan for invading Iraq. On the evening of Feb. 4 at U.N. headquarters, Powell went over his speech one final time. The analysts sent up what visuals they had. Bush and the others listened intently. And as the elder Bush’s defense secretary, Cheney watched attentively as his Joint Chiefs chairman hoovered up publicity. “I am capable of self-pity,” Powell wrote in “My American Journey,” his 1995 memoir. And when it came to policy in the Middle East, Powell was not where the rest of Bush’s team was. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don’t think so. … the claim that experts agree UAVs fitted with spray tanks are “an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons” is WEAK. What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. Iraq, it was by then widely understood, had played no role in the Sept. 11 attacks, nor did it possess weapons of mass destruction. Colin Powell has called his 2003 speech to the United Nations, laying out the Bush administration’s rationale for war in Iraq, a “blot” on his record. So it needs to be more convincing. Powell had reason to feel sanguine about the process as well. This claim too is highly questionable and might be subjected to criticism by UN inspection officials. Bush was not at all like his father, whom Powell had greatly admired. The two had traveled in the same foreign-policy circles for decades, but their collegiality had begun to fray over Iraq. Part 1: Introduction Thank you, Mr. President. Inspector General Rebukes EPA for Failing to Protect Communities From Carcinogenic Air Pollution, Republican Running for Virginia Governor Took Cash From Lobbyists Tied to “Woke” Coca-Cola, Longtime Bloomberg Ally Bets on Andrew Yang for New York, just before the January 30 intercepted conversation. To the caucus, he said: “You may not trust Dick Cheney. **/WEAK. The only reason he bought the mapping software, he said, was because he thought the hardware wouldn’t work without it. Colin Powell delivered his presentation making the case for war with Iraq at the United Nations 15 years ago, on February 5, 2003. This would be somewhat true in terms of short-range missiles with conventional warheads, but is questionable in terms of longer-range missiles or biological warheads. If the State Department’s top team had emptied out their desks, what would Powell’s close friend Straw have done? As measured and even-tempered as Tenet was mercurial, he wore natty suspenders but was otherwise a by-the-book professional who pored over classified documents with a ruler, sliding it slowly downward line by line. Now, with that for context, it’s useful to look back at what Powell said in a November, 2005 interview with Barbara Walters: There was some people in the intelligence community who knew at that time that some of these sources were not good and shouldn’t be relied upon, and they didn’t speak up. “If Powell had decided to resign in advance of the Iraq war,” Straw told me, “I would almost certainly have done so, too.” Blair’s support in the Labour Party would have cratered — and had Blair withdrawn his support for war under pressure from Parliament or simply failed to win an authorization vote, the narrative of collapsed momentum would have dominated the news coverage for weeks. The task of supervising the intelligence on Iraq’s weapons program fell largely to Tenet’s deputy director, John McLaughlin. The second INR memo, written on February 3, 2003, told Powell this: Our key remaining concern is the claim that the tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that “far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets.” In fact, the most comparable U.S. system is a tactical rocket — the U.S. Mark 66 air-launched 70mm rocket — that uses the same, high-grade (7075-T6) aluminum, and that has specifications with similar tolerances. It was the centerpiece of the discussion.”. Colin Powell's New Book: War With Iraq Never Debated By Dan Froomkin WASHINGTON -- In his new book, former Secretary of State Colin Powell provides what may be the most authoritative confirmation yet that there was never a considered debate in the George W. Bush White House about whether going to war in Iraq was really a good idea. "Dealing with Iraq would show a major commitment to antiterrorism," Don Rumsfeld said. He enjoyed performing sleight-of-hand coin tricks, which earned him the code name Merlin from the C.I.A. Asylum seeker? Iraqi intelligence officials posing as WMD scientists. Seated in the row behind Powell is CIA Director George Tenet. All other sources are linked below. as the Case. Libby’s team had claimed that a shipment of aluminum tubes that the C.I.A. The U.N. was the aggrieved party. Powell is a recipient of the Silver Buffalo Award, the highest adult award given by the Boy Scouts of America. “You’ve got to get Tony to convince the president to go to the U.N.,” he said. Note that the Mk 66 specifications are unclassified, and the Department is planning to share them with the [International Atomic Energy Agency]. The C.I.A. Le secrétaire d'Etat américain Colin POWELL a prononcé aujourd'hui un discours attendu devant le conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, concernant les preuves des liens du régime irakien avec Al -Qaïda, ainsi que la détention par l'Irak d'armes de destruction massive. McLaughlin tried again. Opposition? Here’s the conversation as Powell presented it at the U.N. As Woodward reported, the bold sentences were simply added by Powell: POWELL: “They’re inspecting the ammunition you have, yes.”, “For the possibility there are forbidden ammo.”, “For the possibility there is by chance forbidden ammo?”, “And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all of the areas yesterday to clean out all of the areas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. “Rich,” Armitage recalled him replying, “if you gave it to me, I’d have to have a taster.”, As one of Powell’s subordinates put it: “The secretary and Armitage thought we could get by with a rope-a-dope approach: Let’s play along. Sensitive files being driven around in cars, in apparent shell game. Reportage. The foreign minister and the secretary of state had become extraordinarily close over the previous year. “About 90 percent?”, The national security adviser gaped at Walpole and McLaughlin. Then they lied about ever producing it (until his defection). The two were alone in the Oval Office on Jan. 13, 2003. Smirking, he replied, “You might tell them I’m curious about it.”. Fresh evidence emerged last night that Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, was so disturbed about questionable American intelligence on Iraq's … As mentioned above, the State Department’s intelligence staff, called the INR, prepared two memos on the presentation. A dozen years later, however, that caginess had mostly fallen away. Sometime in May 2002, Bush received a Presidential Daily Briefing from the C.I.A. But a thick silence settled in after he finished. POWELL: [W]e know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing [sic] rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq. Powell’s customary 11 p.m. calls to the Straw household had prompted Straw’s wife to refer to him as “the other man in my life.” The August meeting at the Lauder residence, Powell would later say, was an attempt to answer a question: “Could we both stop a war?”. analysts maintained that the tubes were for rocket launchers. Clearly, Powell’s loyalty to Bush extended to being willing to deceive the world: the United Nations, Americans, and the coalition troops about to be sent to kill and die in Iraq. IRAK - Colin Powell exige des réponses sur les fausses informations L'ancien secrétaire d'État américain avait affirmé à l'ONU que Saddam Hussein disposait d'armes de … “Because I want you sitting right behind me when I give it tomorrow morning.” Tenet was reluctant — he was aware that his appearing with the secretary would give the appearance that the C.I.A. “He’s got their undivided attention. Such claims are not credible and are open to criticism, particularly by the UN inspectorates. Not long after meeting Powell, I did manage to speak to several analysts who helped produce the classified assessment of Iraq’s supposed weapons program and who had not previously talked with reporters. Meanwhile, Powell’s chief of staff, Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, was also hashing out the text on weapons with Hannah. Commanders established committees to ensure their units retained no evidence of old WMD. A number of voices inside the administration had for years before the Sept. 11 attacks viewed Hussein as a principal sponsor of radical Palestinian groups and now maintained that any counterterrorism effort worth its salt necessarily encompassed Iraq. It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced 4 tons of the deadly nerve agent, VX. And it’s no surprise the Iraqi said this. POWELL: A dozen [WMD] experts have been placed under house arrest, not in their own houses, but as a group at one of Saddam Hussein’s guest houses. But Powell had also offered unsolicited policymaking advice to the White House and off-the-cuff troop-downsizing estimates to the press. presented Bush with the first intelligence appearing to confirm his nightmare scenario: Hussein intended to attack the United States. The presentation on the vendor’s web page seemed to confirm this account. Wolfowitz thought Cheney’s chief of staff had done a great job. And although Powell would not admit it, Bush’s request that he be the one to make the case against Hussein to the U.N. was enormously flattering. As an intelligence official — one of many who spoke to me on the condition of anonymity — said: “We knew where we were headed, and that was war. Powell’s speech can be found on the State Department website here.
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